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ABSTRACT
Consistency of functional characteristics in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a concern
confronting sellers and buyers.  This research analyzes contract incentives for importers with
respect to cost and potential risk of acceptance.  A principal-agent framework is utilized to
examine contract incentives.  In the principal-agent contract, the principal offers the contract, the
agent rejects or accepts the contract, and then decides how much effort to apply.  All this is
subject to risk for the agent and moral hazard for the principal.  An example is presented, for
which equilibrium contract terms are a base price of 454 cents per bushel for low quality wheat
and a premium of 36 cents per bushel if high quality is achieved.  The premium for high quality
is unchanged as the agent’s outside option increases, but increases as the probability of
conformance with high effort declines or as the agent’s cost of high effort increases.  Small
changes in several of the parameter values (agent’s outside option, agent’s cost of high/low
effort, principal value for high/low effort, and principal’s outside options if the contract was not
extended or if the agent rejects the contract) result in the principal not offering a contract.
Key Words:  Incentive Contact, Functional Characteristic, Wheat, Principal-Agent * Wilson is Professor, Maxwell is a former Graduate Research Assistant, and Dahl is a Research
Scientist in the Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics, North Dakota State University,
Fargo, ND.  This project extends results of an earlier Master’s Thesis by Del Albert Peterson, the results
of which are reported in Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl (2004).
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS TO MEET  FUNCTIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS IN WHEAT PURCHASING
William W. Wilson, Brett J. Maxwell, and Bruce L. Dahl
*
INTRODUCTION
Increased privatization of wheat importing firms has led to increased demand for high-
quality U.S. wheat with a focus on greater quality consistency (Wilson, Dahl, and Johnson,
2000).  Functional performance consistency in hard red spring (HRS) wheat is a  problem
confronting buyers and sellers.  Lack of consistency can be interpreted as uncertainty which
arises from a combination of varietal differences, varying production practices, environmental
conditions, handling, and marketing.  Given the uncertainty and asymmetry in information on
quality between buyers and sellers, buyers are exposed to quality risk involving moral hazard
when purchasing grain.  Guarantees for quality of functional characteristics in the marketing
system are problematic because many characteristics require laboratory testing and, therefore,
are not available on a timely basis.  As such, tests for functional characteristics are not
commonly used in procurement contracts.  
Buyers may pursue alterative purchase strategies such as limiting purchases to specific
locations, varieties, combinations of variety and location, or requirement of specific functional
tests in an effort to reduce costs and risks.  These alternatives have been examined in a
companion paper (Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl, 2004) which provides a detailed statistical
analysis of the costs and risks of conforming to end-use requirements using different strategies. 
Further, tests for functional traits have a time requirement that exceeds the normal logistical
requirements of receiving grain, storing, loading, and shipping vessels.  Thus, there is a time lag
between the transaction and documentation necessary to use functional trait tests as a means to
reject lots.  However, suppliers could exert extra effort to procure wheat to meet and verify its
functional requirements prior to shipping by selecting origins and pre-testing grain for functional
traits in-transit and/or in storage prior to loading.  Suppliers would confront risk and buyers may
be subject to moral hazard, if they are not able to observe or verify this effort.
Contract mechanisms are an alternative for buyers choosing to reduce costs, risks, and
moral hazard problems.  In this study, a principal-agent model was developed and analyzed
using game theory methods.  These models were used to estimate incentives required for
principals and agents to accept contract terms.  The model was used to evaluate effects of factors
including the probability of achieving tolerance levels with agent effort, agent effort costs, the
payoff to the agent of an outside option to the principal’s contract, and the value of high revenue
to the principal on the agent adoption of contracts.  The major contribution of this study is that it
provides an interpretation of contractual mechanisms with suggested incentives to reduce
problems related to quality consistency.   2
BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS STUDIES
Wheat-Quality Consistency Problems
Research on quality consistency has become more common as the heterogeneity of the
U.S. wheat market continues to expand.  Dahl and Wilson (1998) documented and examined the
effects of quality consistency for HRS wheats at different points throughout the production and
marketing system.  They found that variability in the quality of U.S. spring wheat was reduced as
it moved from farm-level production to the U.S. export level.  Variability for many wheat and
functional characteristics at the producer level was impacted largely by year-to-year variability
(i.e., environment), followed by location and variety.  Variability in the mix tolerance index
(MTI) and wet gluten were found to be affected more by location and variety; whereas, mix time
was largely affected by environment and variety.  Their results indicate buying strategies that
focus on location and/or varieties would improve quality consistency.  
Effects of variability in export quality were also examined to determine effects on
alternative pricing methods (Dahl and Wilson, 1999).  They utilized three alternative pricing
methods including: buying on a “net wheat” price, valuing wheat lots based on a millable wheat
index, and valuing lots based on the net profit (value added) in milling.  These pricing methods
largely focus on effects of variability in wheat characteristics (e.g., moisture content, dockage,
foreign material, shrunken and broken, damaged kernels), although the value added in milling
also incorporates effects of flour extraction rates.  None of the methods consider variability in
functional characteristics.
  Wilson and Preszler (1992) utilized the input characteristic model (ICM) to analyze
effects of price and quality on competition in the U.K. wheat import market.  The U.K. market
was targeted for this analysis because it illustrates the fierce competition between the U.S. and
Canadian export markets, and the U.K. is characteristic of numerous markets in which higher-
protein wheat from the United States and Canada compete for use in blends with lower-quality
native wheat.  For most characteristics, the expected values of functional characteristic
performance for U.S. wheat had variances which exceeded those of Canadian varieties.  The
Canadian varieties possessing the lower variances in quality characteristics lowered the overall
costs because a greater proportion of cheaper wheat could be used in the blending process.  This
occurrence resulted in shifting from U.S. to Canadian wheat.  However, the impact of quality
characteristics for the U.K. or any importing country cannot be assessed without considering the
impact of price on these purchasing practices, as well as functional quality.  Thus, both quality
characteristics and price impact the distribution of market shares and are strategic variables for
exporter countries.
Procurement Strategies and Practices
Procurement strategies utilized by wheat end-users range from simple spot market
transactions to vertical integration.  Strategies in between these two extremes are numerous and
are more common.  Examples include contracting, testing and segregation practices, targeting of
origins and varieties, contracting production practices and identity preservation (Wilson and
Dahl, 2002).3
Testing and segregation practices by end-users often include location segregation
techniques accompanied by either pre-shipment or pre-processing testing, or a combination of
the two.  Targeting origins and varieties consists of purchasing wheat from a given county or
region, purchasing a particular variety, or both.  More elaborate contracts may specify
production practices, overseeing the production practices on desired acreage, and requiring the
final product to meet functional quality requirements.
.
Identity Preservation (IP) practices are growing for select varieties of U.S. wheat classes. 
The IP revolution involves identifying desirable quality attributes which are not widely
available.  Some believe that incentives to the IP system should provoke expansion to the point
that those qualities will become commonplace, displacing varieties that do not offer desirable
characteristics.  Examples of current IP systems being adopted are General Mills, which is in the
process of converting all of its cereal plants for IP handling of wheat and oats (Willis, 2001) and
Warburtons, a bread baker in England that contracts for purchase of specific varieties and
locations of wheat from the Canadian Wheat Board. 
Contract Alternatives
Wheat is usually marketed based on grades, factor limits, and other specifications. 
Buyers desiring specific wheat classes and quality needs specify minimum requirements upon
which all price offerings are based.  The specifications become part of the purchase contract and
impact price.  The grain grading and inspection agency is required to certify the specifications of
the wheat to insure that the buyer and seller both know that the buyer is receiving what was
agreed to be purchased (Oades, 2001).  Quality factors routinely certified on export cargoes are
numerical grade, class, moisture content, protein content, and dockage content.  Certification of
additional quality factors can also be specified in the contract and be performed and certified by
the USDA’s Federal Grain Inspection Service or a private inspection company (U.S. Wheat
Associates, 2001).  Wheat buyers normally specify easily measurable wheat characteristics as an
element of purchase quality specifications for technological reasons.  The effectiveness of these
specifications relies on the correlation between the desired functional characteristics and the
wheat characteristics specified.  Poor correlations result in greater uncertainty in functional
performance.
Some end-users have begun contracting for selected wheat varieties.  Variety specific
procurement strategies help end-users meet functional quality requirements which they are
unable to capture through normal commodity market channels (Dahl and Wilson, 1998). 
Producers, in turn, receive a premium for producing those wheats, which may compensate for
lesser yield and for possible risks associated with conditions, which may inhibit them from
meeting minimum contract specifications. 
Cost and Risk of Purchasing Strategies 
Not conforming to end-use requirements has important implications for food processors. 
Implications include the risk of not conforming to contract specifications, greater costs
associated with higher quality purchases, and the effect of increased operating costs associated
with likely stock-out costs due to nonconformance (Wilson, Dahl, and Johnson, 2000).  1 Strategies included additional costs for location = 1.5 c/bu, variety = 4.6 c/bu, and functional
tests farinograph = 0.6 c/bu, and loaf volume = 0.5 c/bu.
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Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl (2004) analyzed effects of alternative purchase strategies on
costs and probability of meeting buyer specifications.  They developed a stochastic simulation
model to evaluate cost risk tradeoffs of alternative purchase strategies.  These strategies include
buying HRS based on wheat protein levels, varieties, locations, and functional characteristics. 
The models determine the probability of a wheat shipment meeting end-user needs based on
different variables (i.e., variety, location, functional characteristics, and cost).  Six separate
procurement strategy models were simulated.
1  Strategies were evaluated for specifications for a
typical end-user buying 14% HRS at the Pacific Northwest (PNW) and required minimums for
protein of 14.2%, absorption of 63%, peaktime 7 of minutes, stability of 14 minutes, and loaf
volume of 1,000 cubic centimeters.
Their analysis found procurement strategies using variety, location, or both, increase the
probability of conformance and reduce the costs over traditional procurement strategies relying
on protein specifications.  For example, purchase of the variety McNeal increased the joint
probability of conformance from .59 for protein specifications only, to .62 while reducing the
cost of procurement from 478 to 468 c/bu. (Table 1).  For buyers at the PNW, Montana locations
were preferred to those in Minnesota, Eastern North Dakota, and South Dakota, due in part to
location, but also the potential of conforming to specifications.  A strategy of purchasing only
from Montana CRD 2 increased conformance to .67.  Purchasing by both variety and location
(McNeal from Montana CRD 9) further increased conformance to .69, although costs of
procurement where higher than for the location only strategy of buying from Montana CRD 2. 
Table 1.  Probability of Meeting Specifications (Comparison Between Base Case and
Location, Variety Models)
Functional Characteristic Base Case Varieties Locations
Varieties &
Locations
McNeal MT2 McNeal & MT9
Absorption 0.95 0.95 0.89 0.99
Peaktime 0.98 0.71 0.88 0.84
Stability 0.71 0.80 0.90 0.79
Loaf Volume 0.90 0.99 0.87 0.99
Joint Probability 0.59 0.62 0.67 0.69
Average Cost PNW
C/bu 478 468 463 467
Strategies were also analyzed that focused on pre-testing for functional end-use
characteristics.  The models determined the cost and probability of meeting specifications when
functional characteristic tests were included.  Testing costs of $40/sample for a farinograph test
and $30/sample for a loaf volume test were included.  All tests had a 95% accuracy assumption,
and 5 samples for every 10 grain cars were tested.5
Two functional characteristic models were analyzed.  One included tests for absorption,
peaktime, and stability.  The second included testing for absorption, peaktime, stability, and loaf
volume.  Comparing results (Table 2) to the base case indicates that the joint probability of
meeting all specifications increased from .59 to .75 when the farinograph test was conducted. 
Procurement costs increased by 2 c/bu when the farinograph test was performed.  Results
indicate that adding testing for loaf volume, although it does not have as much impact on the
results as the farinograph test, improved the joint probability of conforming to end-user
specifications.  The joint probability increased from .75 to .81 when tests for loaf volume were
included and average costs increased 1 c/bu (Table 2).
Results indicated purchase strategies that include pre-testing for functional characteristics
can improve joint probabilities of meeting buyer requirements.  Strategies that rely on pre-testing
improved joint probabilities of conformance (i.e, reduced buyer’s risk) more than purchase by
variety, location, or variety by location strategies.
Table 2.  Probability of Meeting Specifications (Comparisons Between Base Case and
Functional Models)
Functional Characteristic Base Case Farinograph Loaf Volume
Absorption 0.95 0.95 0.95
Peaktime 0.98 0.95 0.95
Stability 0.71 0.95 0.95
Loaf Volume 0.90 0.88 0.95
Joint Probability 0.59 0.75 0.81
Average Cost PNW
C/bu 478 480 481
Table 3 compares the cost and risks of all procurement strategies.  Functional testing
yields the highest joint probability of conformance but comes with the highest price due to high
testing costs.  Buying based on high protein yields high joint probabilities as well, but protein
premiums are costly.  Inclusion of location and variety are less costly and yield similar results,
providing evidence that this strategy is optimal when the cost of delivering HRS to the PNW is
considered.






Base Case 0.59 478
Wheat and Protein 13% 0.25 469
Wheat and Protein 14% 0.53 477
Wheat and Protein 15% 0.62 485
Location 0.67 463
Variety 0.62 468
Location and Variety 0.69 467
Functional Tests 0.81 481
* All strategies also include specifications for protein.6
Specifying greater wheat protein, which is used extensively by end-users, results in
greater cost (protein premiums) to buyers.  Protein levels are easy to measure, allowing for
transactions with few hurdles to overcome.  More specific strategies such as location and variety
involve greater communication between suppliers and end-users.  Long-term relationships would
likely develop within such a contract.  End-users could agree to buy agreed-upon lots of HRS for
a stated period of years from a producer.  Premiums and discounts could then be applied to
transactions that meet, or fail to meet, specifications.
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS FOR IMPROVING FUNCTIONAL TRAITS
Contracts can be designed by wheat buyers to address cost/risk tradeoffs involving moral
hazard and analyzed as a principal-agent problem where the buyer is the principal and the seller
is the agent.  Asymmetric information is present and most grain buyers are unable to monitor
producers and handlers (agents) throughout the production and transportation process.  A
principal-agent model was used to examine the application of contracting for wheat functional
traits.  A theoretical representation is made first and then results are generated using distributions
from Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl (2004) to evaluate the terms of an incentive contract.
Principal-Agent Theory and Contracting for Functional Traits
The agent has information that is not available to the principal.  The opportunity and
technology costs of performing the task are elements that may be better known to the agent than
the principal (Laffont and Martimort, 2002).  Moral hazard exists because the principal cannot
monitor the effort of the agent.  A feature of a principal-agent contract under imperfect
information is that the agent does not bear the full consequences of his own actions because there
is unobservability by the principal.  The goal for the principal is to design a contract to induce
desired effort by the agent. 
Figure 1 illustrates the principal-agent game with moral hazard and hidden actions.  The
principal can either offer a contract or not and the agent either accepts or rejects it.  If the agent
accepts, the agent decides how much effort to exert.  Nature creates randomness and outcomes
are represented as payoffs for each player and node.7
Figure 1.  Principal-Agent Game with Moral Hazard and Hidden Action
Payoffs for the principal are impacted by the effort of the agent.  If the agent expends high
effort, high payoffs are likely to accompany his effort and vice versa.  Nature influences the
outcome in that even if high effort is put forth by the agent, a low payoff may be realized due to 
risks in performing functions.  Designing a contract that maximizes the expected utility/profit but
appeals to the agent and induces high effort actions is the objective of the principal. 
Mathematically (Rasmusen, 2001, pp. 172-173), the principal’s problem is:
Maximize EV (q(ê,2) - w(q(ê,2)))
where EV is the expected utility for the principal; output q is a function of effort ê and nature 2;
and payoff w is also a function of effort and nature.
Subject to:
ê = argmax EU (e,w(q (e,2))) (incentive compatibility constraint)
EU (ê , w(q(ê ,2))) $U (participation constraint)
where EU is the expected utility for the agent and U is the reservation utility for the agent or the
value of some outside opportunity.  The incentive compatibility constraint induces the agent to
pick the desired effort (Rasmusen, 2001).  The participation constraint represents the incentive
needed to induce the agent to accept the contract terms, rather than an outside opportunity. 

















In deterministic extensive form games such as the principal-agent problem, decisions
are discrete.  An agent either accepts or rejects the contract, and exerts high or low effort. 
However, strategies are not always deterministic, or pure Nash equilibrium.  A mixed Nash
equilibrium strategy, or a strategy that involves chance, eliminates some of the predictability in a
principal-agent relationship (Gardner, 1994).  Mathematically, a mixed strategy is a probability
distribution over pure strategies.  Mixed strategies indicate the likelihood of one strategy being
adopted (Watson, 2002).  Player a believes with a  L probability that strategy s is the best strategy
(Watson, 2002).  The expected value for player a is his payoff if strategy s is played. 
Mathematically:
EV(s, L) = L*(s) + (1 - L)*(b).
The payoff is the expected value given the probability of each strategy being selected.  
Mixed strategies reflect randomness in a principal-agent game.  Randomness can result in
mixed strategies implying that an agent may decide to accept the contract 70% of the time and
reject it 30% of the time.  A principal that is not satisfied with the acceptance rate has to change
contract terms to make the contract more appealing.    
Grain Contracting for Functional Traits
Incentive contracts for functional traits in grain marketing is nonconventional, but can be
motivated by a number of factors.  First, conventional contracting on grain (grade, protein,
location, variety) is not completely effective in reconciling functional trait requirements (as
illustrated by Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl, 2004).  Second, tests for functional traits, while
possible, have time requirements that exceed the normal logistical standards of receiving grain,
loading, and shipping vessels.  Thus, there is a time lag between the transaction and
documentation necessary to use functional tests as a means to reject lots.  Further, these are
subject to risk.  Third, suppliers can exert effort to procure wheat to meet and verify its functional
requirements prior to shipping.  This can be done by selecting origins and pre-testing grain for
functional traits in-transit and/or in storage prior to loading.  However, buyers are not able to
observe or verify this effort.  An incentive contract requires the buyer to specify a base price
along with a reward or bonus for meeting targeted functional requirements.  This could be
awarded after a ship is loaded (or in-transit) during which time the functional trait would be
evaluated by a designated lab.  Upon confirming these values, the agent or shipper would receive
an ex-post (shipping) bonus, or not, depending on the results of these tests.
The problem is illustrated in Figure 2.  The principal chooses whether to offer a contract
or not, where he may have an outside option if he does not offer the contract.  Presumably, this
would simply be to continue buying on generic commodity contract terms (no effort).  The agent
can either accept or reject the contract; where, if rejected, the agent may have alternative offers
and the principal may again have the option of continuing to buy on generic contract terms (no
effort).  If the agent accepts, the agent decides whether to exert high or low effort.  High effort
could involve conducting pre-shipment tests for functional traits and additional effort in searching9
for specific qualities of grain, etc.  Low effort could entail doing limited activities and simply
taking a chance of meeting the function trait (this could imply specifying a higher protein level). 
Payoffs and probabilities are assigned throughout the representations.  The problem would be
solved through backward induction to arrive at a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
The principal specifies a contract in which the price depends on performance which is
based on an ex post evaluation of quality.  This can be interpreted as, for example, upon loading,
a sample is taken at the export port or at the import port and a third party evaluates it for
functional performance.  The contract may state that X composite samples will be retained from
the ship loading and used to conduct functional tests.  If the tests conform to functional
requirements, the shipper receives a bonus.  If not, the shipper receives the base price.  Agents
may or may not exert additional effort to procure grain that meets specifications for the principal. 
This effort may include 1) conducting their own tests for functional characteristics when
gathering lots for sale or 2) searching for specific qualities of wheat, etc.  Both would likely


























Figure 2.  Principal Versus Agent, Imperfect Information Without Monitoring10
We develop an example where the payoff, or value, to the principal, of wheat that meets
functional requirements is $5.10/bushel and $4.90/bushel if not.  Agent’s costs of procuring
supplies for sale are $4.70/bushel and $4.80/bushel for low and high effort, respectively (implying
the cost of high effort was 10 c/bu).  The principal has the outside option of buying on grain
specifications only (no effort) from other agents for $4.73/bushel.  Outside options are available if
the principal either does not extend a contract or if the agents reject the contract.  Agents have an
outside option of selling to an alternative principal for $4.73/bushel with no effort for a payoff of
3 c/bu.  Since the agent has risk in meeting desired specifications with a given level of effort, the
potential of achieving outcomes was represented by probabilities, conditional on the level of
effort extended.  Initially, probabilities of achieving high quality with high, low, and no effort
were .81, .53, and .25, respectively, using probabilities derived from Wilson, Peterson, and Dahl
(2004).  Base case assumptions are shown in Table 4.
Table 4.  Base Case Assumptions for Incentive Contract
Assumption Item
Payoff to Principal if 
    Specifications met
    Specifications not met
510 c/bu
490 c/bu
Cost to Principal for procuring from outside agent with
no effort when contract rejected or no contract extended
473 c/bu
Payoff to Agent for alternative market with low effort 3 c/bu
Agent cost of 
  High effort
  Low effort
480 c/bu
470 c/bu
Probability of Meeting Specifications with
  High effort
  Low effort




The minimum base price and premium that should be offered to the agent to induce high
effort can be derived from the incentive compatibility and participation constraints.  If we assume
that there is no uncertainty in achieving high quality with high effort, the incentive compatibility
constraint is:
PH– 480 > PL – 470 (1)
where the prices paid to the agent based on high and low effort are PH and PL, respectively,
meaning that the agent’s revenue for high effort must exceed the revenue for low effort.  The
participation constraint with no uncertainty is:
PH – 480 > 3 (2)11
meaning that the net revenue for high effort must be greater than alternative offers to other
principals which require no effort (in this case, the alternative offer is 3 c/bu), or the agent rejects
the contract and sells to the alternative principal. 
Given that Nature affects the outcomes of effort by the agent, the agent’s expected payoffs
for high and low effort are:
EVHE = .81 PHQ + .19 PLQ – 480, (3)
EVLE = .53 PHQ + .47 PLQ – 470 (4)
where EVHE and EVLE are the expected payoff for high and low effort, respectively, and PHQ and
PLQ are prices paid to the agent if high quality and low quality are realized, respectively.  To
induce high effort, the principal must make sure that the high effort payoff (3) pays more than the
low effort payoff (4).  The incentive compatibility constraint with uncertainty is then:
.81 PHQ + .19 PLQ – 480 > .53 PHQ + .43 PLQ – 470 (5)
Rearranging and solving the incentive compatibility constraint inequality (5) yields:
PHQ > PLQ + 35.71 (6)
The agent is paid more for producing high quality whether he/she applied high effort or not. 
Given that the agent puts forth high effort, the principal must make sure that the contract is
accepted.  The participation constraint after accounting for the effects of Nature must then be
satisfied.  The participation constraint is then:
0.81PHQ + 0.19PLQ – 480 > 3 (7)
which can be simplified to:
PHQ > 560 - .24 PLQ.( 8 )
Figure 3 is derived to illustrate the incentive compatibility and participation constraints,
which are as follows:
Incentive compatibility constraint:   PHQ = PLQ + 35.71 (9)
Participation constraint:  PHQ = 560 - .24PLQ (10)
Prices that satisfy both constraints lie above both lines (Figure 3).  Prices above the participation
constraint are required for the agent to choose to accept the contract versus the outside alternative. 
Prices above and to the left of the incentive compatibility constraint are required for the agent to
choose the desired action.  The feasible set contains any/all points above the intersection of the
two lines and because the principal decides the contract terms, the principal will choose that
which is minimum.  Prices higher than these constraints would be acceptable to agents; however,
they would impose higher costs on the principal.12
Substituting the right-hand side of Equation 10 into Equation 9 for PHQ, and rearranging
allows for us to solve for the minimum value of PLQ and PHQ which satisfies both Equations 9 and
10.  The minimum point that satisfies both constraints is (454, 490).  These represent the
minimum prices principals should offer to pay agents for a shipment that does not meet
specifications (454) and for meeting specifications (490).  The minimum acceptable incentive
contract in this case would specify a base price of 454 with a 36 c/bu (490-454) premium for
meeting buyer specifications for functional characteristics.
Sensitivity of Minimum Equilibrium Contract Terms
Probability of Conformance with Effort
The results of this model are highly sensitive to several of the parameters assumed.  One
of these parameters is the probability of conformance with high effort by the agent.  Minimum
equilibrium contract terms (prices for high quality and low quality) were derived for alternative
probabilities of conformance given high effort by the agent.  These were varied from a probability
of .9 to .6 of meeting high quality with high effort.  In the base case, a probability of conformance
of .81 resulted in contract prices for high and low quality of 490 c/bu and 454 c/bu (Table 5).  If
the probability of meeting specifications with high effort increased from 0.81 in the base case to
0.9, the minimum acceptable price principals would offer for lots not meeting specifications
increases from 454 to 459 c/bu (Figure 4, Table 5).  The price principals would offer for lots
meeting specifications decreases from 490 to 486 c/bu, implying a decline in the premium if high
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Figure 3.  Principal Versus Agent, Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints,
Probability of Meeting Specifications for High Effort = .81.13








    .6 540 397 143
    .7 501 442 59
    .8 490 453 37
    .9 486 459 27
Similarly, if an agent were able to adopt an effort strategy that reduced the probability of
conformance with high effort to .7, the equilibrium contract terms for high quality would be
increased to 501 c/bu, and the price for low quality would decrease to 442 c/bu implying a
premium for high quality of 59 c/bu.  If the probability of conformance with high effort further
declines to .6, the premium for high quality increases to 143 c/bu.  These results illustrate, as the
probability of meeting contract specifications decreases (i.e., due to greater risk), the price for
meeting specifications increases and for failing to meet specifications decreases because there is a
higher probability that low quality will be realized.  In order for the supplier to accept such a
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Figure 4.  Principal Versus Agent, Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints,
Probability of Meeting Specifications for High Effort = .9.14
specifications.  The key point is that, if it is more risky for the agent to perform, a higher bonus is
required to induce him to expend high effort.
Outside Option for Agent
In the base case, the agent has an outside option to exert low effort and obtain a payoff of
3 c/bu.  The value of this outside option was varied from 0 to 10 c/bu to determine effects on
equilibrium contract prices for high and low quality.  As the value of the outside option increased,
equilibrium prices for high and low quality increased while maintaining the difference in contract
prices between high and low quality at 36 c/bu (Table 6).  The effect on equilibrium contract
terms of the agent’s outside option is on the level of prices for high and low quality, but does not
affect the premium for high quality. 
Table 6.  Equilibrium Contract Prices: For High/Low Quality by Value of Agent’s
Outside Option







    0  487 451 36
    3 490 454 36
    5 492 456 36
    7 494 458 36
  10 497 461 36
* May not add due to rounding.
Cost to Agent of High Effort
In the base case, the cost of high effort by the agent was 480 c/bu., while the cost of low
effort was 470 c/bu. implying additional costs for high effort of 10 c/bu.  The cost of high effort
was varied from 472 c/bu to 490 c/bu to determine effects on equilibrium contract prices for high
and low quality.  Results indicate that as the cost of high effort increases, the prices paid for high
quality increase, prices for low quality decrease, and the premium for high quality becomes larger
(Table 7).  Other sensitivities such as varying the value to the principal for high effort or the value
of the principal’s outside option affect the principal’s decision to extend the contract or not, but
do not affect the equilibrium contract prices for high and low quality.  15
Table 7.  Equilibrium Contract Prices: For High/Low Quality by Cost of High Effort for
Agent








    472  476 469 7
    474 480 465 15
    476 483 462 21
    478 486 458 28
    480 490 454 36
    482 493 450 43
    484 497 447 50
    486 500 443 57
    488 503 439 64
    490 507 435 72
Analysis of Participation Strategies for Equilibrium Contracts
Equilibrium contract terms are those required for the agent to participate in the contract
and to provide the incentive to choose the right effort.  Participation is also impacted by outside
options, especially in the case of the principal, which affect whether the principal will offer the
contract.  Results for equilibrium contract terms, payoffs, probabilities of meeting requirements
by effort level, and outside options from the prior model were input into the game theory analysis
software Gambit (McKelvey, McLennan, and Turocy, 2004) to determine optimal strategies for
both principals and agents.  Solutions consisted of pure and mixed equilibrium strategies for the
principal and the agent.  The game analysis is similar to the earlier analysis but, instead of
limiting results to the payoffs and incentive compatibility and participation constraints,
equilibrium strategies were evaluated for a range of factors and assumptions which focused on
factors affecting the principal’s decision whether to extend the contract or not.
In the base model, the principal has the option to purchase on grain specifications only for
$4.73/bu either when the principal does not offer the contract or when the agent rejects the
contract.  The payoff for the principal from this outside option assumes the same values for high
and low quality, the same probabilities for achieving high quality with no effort, and has an
expected payoff of 21 c/bu which is applied both if the contract is not extended and if the agent
rejects the contract. 
Optimal strategies by the principal and agent are influenced by a number of factors
including the probability of achieving tolerance levels with agent effort, agent effort costs, the16
payoff to the agent of an outside option to the principal’s contract, and the value of high revenue
to the principal.  Sensitivities were conducted to determine how adjustments in these factors will
influence the optimal strategies for equilibrium contract terms. 
The probability of conformance with high effort by the agent was varied from .6 to .9. 
Optimal strategies were solved for both the principal and agent for these simulations using
equilibrium contract terms, payoffs, and probabilities of conformance.  Results indicate that
varying the probability of conformance does not impact the principal’s decision to extend the
contract.  Table 8 summarizes the equilibrium strategies of the buyer (principal) and supplier
(agent) and the coinciding changes in payoffs for high and low effort.  At all probabilities the
equilibrium is one of mixed strategies.  A mixed strategy of 0.50 of accepting the contract
indicates that 50% of the time, the supplier will accept the contract offered by the principal.  This
occurs because by definition, these are equilibrium values or alternatively, are point at which the
agent would be indifferent between these two choices.























Sensitivity of Probability of Conformance for Agent High Effort
0.6 540, 397 143 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.7 501, 442 59 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.8 490, 453 37 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.9 484, 472 27 1.00 0.50 0.50
Sensitivity of Probability of Conformance for No Effort 
(Principal’s outside options of no contract and contract rejected)
0.25 490, 453 37 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.30 490, 453 37 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.35 490, 453 37 1.00 0.50 0.50
0.40 490, 453 37 0.99 0.50 0.50
0.45 490, 453 37 0.01 0.50 0.5017
Sensitivities were also examined for the probability of conformance for no-effort within
the principal’s outside options if the contract is rejected by the agent and if the principal does not
offer a contract.  Results show that as probabilities for no effort increase over .40, the equilibrium
strategy shifts so that the principal does not extend the contract.  Thus, for this example, the
probabilities of conformance for different effort levels affect payoffs, equilibrium contract terms,
and also impact the principal’s optimal strategies. 
Sensitivities were conducted to evaluate the impact of some of the important factors
impacting equilibrium strategies.  These include the payoff for the outside option of  the agent,
the agent’s cost of high and low effort, the principal’s value for high and low quality, and the
principal’s costs for procuring from alternative agents, either if the contract is rejected or no
contract is extended.  Results are summarized in Table 9.  If an outside option to the agent
exceeds 5 c/bu, this will induce the buyer to not offer the contract.  When the cost of exerting
high effort is greater than 486 c/bu or the cost of low effort is greater than 476 c/bu, the buyer
would not offer the contract.  If the value to the principal of high quality decreases to less than
502 c/bu or the value of low quality is greater than 498 c/bu, the buyer would not offer the
contract.  If the cost of procuring from alternative agents decreases to less than 472 c/bu or if the
costs of procuring from alternative agents when the agent rejects the contract are greater than 476
c/bu (implying a maximum cost for development of the contract of 3 c/bu), the principal would
not offer a contract. 
When a principal offers a contract and it is rejected, the principal’s cost of procuring from
an outside agent would likely be higher than when the contract is not offered due to the fact that
the principal may have costs in developing the contract that he would not incur if no contract
were extended.  Therefore, it is important to determine how this cost influences the decision of
the principal.  As Table 10 implies, increased disparity between the principal’s cost of procuring
from alternate agents when the contract is rejected and when contract is not offered influences the
principal’s equilibrium strategy.  As the cost for alternative agents when the contract is rejected
increases relative to the costs when no contract is offered, the likelihood of the principal offering
the contract declines.  When the costs for procuring from outside agents exceed 476 c/bu, the
principal would not offer the contract.  Therefore, in this case the cost of developing the contract
must be 3 c/bu or lower for the principal to offer the contract. 
The cost of procuring from alternative agents when not offering the contract also
influences the decision of the principal.  Table 11 indicates that when costs of procuring from
alternative agents when not offering the contract decrease relative to the costs if the agent rejects
or accepts the contract, it is more likely that principal will not offer the contract.  For example, a
decrease in the cost of procuring from outside agents when the contract is not offered to 471 c/bu
results in the principal preferring to not extend the contract.  Increases in the cost of procuring
from alternative agents when no contract is extended over the base value of 473 have no effect on
the principal’s optimal strategy to extend the contract.18
Table 9.  Sensitivities for Equilibrium Contract Terms
Contract Terms
Base Case
Value Buyer Will Not Offer Contract If:
Agent’s Parameters
  Outside Option for Agent 3 c/bu If outside option >5 c/bu
  Cost of High Effort 480 c/bu If high effort costs > 486 c/bu
  Cost of Low Effort 470 c/bu If low effort costs > 476 c/bu
Principal’s Parameters
High Quality Value 510 c/bu If high quality value < 502 c/bu
Low Quality Value 490 c/bu If low quality value > 498 c/bu
Principal’s Outside Option 
When No Contract Extended
473 c/bu If the expected cost of procuring supplies
from alternative agents when no contract is
extended declines to less than 472 c/bu
Principal’s Outside Option
When Agent Rejects Contract
473 c/bu If the expected cost of procuring supplies
from alternative agents when the contract is
rejected increases to more than 476 c/bu
Table 10.  Equilibrium Strategies as Principal’s Costs for Procuring From Outside Agents
Varies if Agent Rejects Contract (Agent Payoff Fixed at 3 c/bu)

















473 c/bu 473 c/bu 1.00 0.50 0.50
473 c/bu 474 c/bu 1.00 0.50 0.50
473 c/bu 475 c/bu 1.00 0.50 0.50
473 c/bu 476 c/bu 1.00 0.50 0.50
473 c/bu 477 c/bu 0.00 0.50 0.5019

























471 473 0.00 0.50 0.50
472 473 1.00 0.50 0.50
473 473 1.00 0.50 0.50
474 473 1.00 0.50 0.50
475 473 1.00 0.50 0.50
SUMMARY
Quality consistency is a major evolving problem in international grain marketing
competition, particularly in the case of HRS wheat.  To confront this problem, buyers have a
number of strategies.  These include: purchase by grade and protein, or supplementing these with
specifications of either varieties, locations and/or values for desired functional traits.  However,
functional characteristics are not easily measurable at the point of sale due to the time required for
tests.  An alternative is for buyers to offer incentive-based contracts to induce unobservable effort
by suppliers.  In this study, principal-agent models were developed to analyze factors affecting
the equilibrium contract terms of incentive contracts for wheat procurement. 
  
An example principal-agent model was developed to estimate the minimum equilibrium
contract terms for low quality and for high quality.  This model was examined to determine the
effect of selected parameters on minimum acceptable incentive prices.  A second principal-agent
model was developed and analyzed for mixed strategies to evaluate the principal’s and agent’s
optimal strategies.  This model focused on effects of the principal’s value for high and low
quality, agent’s costs for high and low effort, and alternative options for both the principal and the
agent on probabilities for the principal extending the contract, agent acceptance, and agent
adoption of high effort.  
A base case was presented where the minimum acceptable incentive contract would
provide a base price paid by the principal to the agent of 454 c/bu for low quality lots and a
premium of 36 c/bu if quality specifications are met.  Results of sensitivities for equilibrium
contract terms indicated:20
C Buyers must know the value of higher quality that sufficiently offsets added costs and
risks to suppliers.  If not, it would not be in their interest to offer incentive contracts.
C The premium required to induce the agent to accept a contract increases with the risk of
not conforming to specifications and/or if the agent’s cost of exerting high effort
increases.
C The premium for high quality is not impacted by the agent’s outside option.
Results indicated optimal strategies for participants are sensitive to parameter values
utilized.  Small changes in several of the parameter values (agent’s outside option, agent’s cost of
high/low effort, principal’s value for high/low effort, and principal’s outside options if the
contract is not extended or if the agent rejects the contract) impact whether it is in the principal’s
interest to offer a contract.  
Though represented here as a principal-agent problem and solved using game theory
techniques, the concept of the contract has applications in the grain marketing industry.  One way
to interpret the implementation of such a contract is as follows.  The buyer offers to buy grain
with a particular level of a functional characteristic.  The offer provides for two prices, a higher
price if the level is met, and a lower price if it is not met.  The supplier can exert effort to affect
the level of the functional characteristic.  As an example, the supplier could target purchases from
certain locations with known levels of the attributes, could conduct pre-shipping tests prior to or
concurrent with loading of railcars from the interior, could specify varieties in their purchase
contracts, and/or could conduct functional tests at the export elevator prior to loading.  Or, the
supplier could exert no or low effort, and just take a chance on meeting the higher quality
specifications.  Of importance here is that the buyer cannot observe the level of effort of the
agent.  But, the principal could test the functional characteristics after loading and/or while in
transit.  Based on the results of these tests, the payment would be made, inclusive of the bonus
implied in the payment scheme.  For example, the contract may read that in order to receive the
bonus, 80% of the samples must conform to the targeted level of the functional characteristic.
While contract specifications with explicit premiums and discounts for grain quality are
routine in grain trading, contracts for functional characteristics are less common, though growing
in use,  and are necessarily more complex.  This research explored how such contracts would be
conceived and specified.  There are several implications from these results.  First, contract terms
can be designed, inclusive of incentives to induce agents to provide additional effort to supply
improved quality in markets where moral hazard and quality uncertainty exist.  Second, the
contracts must be conceived by buyers who have a value for higher functional quality grains and
necessarily require a price schedule implying a premium and discount and some risk sharing with
the supplier.  Third, it is important that small changes in any of the model parameters can result in
different contract terms and can alter the principal’s and agent’s equilibrium strategies.  This is
compounded by the likelihood that the probability of conformance for strategies changes over
time due to  environmental effects, changes in varieties adopted, etc.21
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